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[Crim. No. 10409. In Bank. Jan. 31,1967.]

In re WILFORD WRIGHT et al., on Habeas Corpus.
Grounds - Evidence.-A writ of habeas
corpus is not available to attack a flnal judgment on the
ground that the conviction rests on evidence obtained by an
illegal ~rch and seizure incident to an unlawful arrest.
[2] Criminal Law-Double Punishment.-Concurrent sentences for
. crimes based on one act or indivisible transaction constitute
mUltiple punishment within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 654,
proscribing double punishment of a criminal act that constitutes more than one crime.
[3] Id.-Double Punishment.-Pen. Code, § 654, forbids multiple
punishment by imposition of the proscribed multiple sen[1] Habeas Corpus -

[2] See C~.Jur.2d. Criminal Law, §§ 214, 215; Am.Jur.2d. Crimi11al Law, § 546 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 26; [2-6] Criminal
Law, § 1475.
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tences, but not multiple convictions, and whether an erroneously sentenced defendant actually suffers excessive punishment cannot be the factor that determines whether the section
is applicable.
[4] Id.-Double punisbment.-Multiple sentences forbidden by
Pen. Code, § 654, proscribing double punishment of a criminal
act that constitutes more than one crime, whether consecutive
or concurrent, impose excessive punishment beyond the power
of the sentencing court and can be corrected by habeas corpus.
(Disapproving PeopZe v. .Anaerson, 75 Cal.App.2d 365, 371
[~2 P. 906]; People v. Pearson, 41 Cal.App.2d 614, 618
[107 P.2d 463]; People v. Dallas, 42 Cal.App.2d 596, 604 [109
P.2d 409]; People v. Benenato, 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 367 [175
P.2d 296]; People v. McWilliams, 87 Cal.App.2d 550, 552 [197
P.2d 216]; People v. Thompson,13S Cal.App.2d 4,10 [284 P.2d
39]).
[6] Id.-Double Punishment.-The proper procedure to be followed by appellate courts to correct multiple sentences violative of Pen. Code, § 654, proscribing double punishment of a
criminal act that constitutes more than one crime, is to eliminate the effect of the judgment as to the less severely punishable offense insofar as penalty alone is concerned.
[8] Id.-Double Punishment.-Where concurrent sentences had
been imposed on defendants who had been convicted of
kidnaping one victim for the purpose of robbery, and for
first degree robbery of that victim, and for first degree
robbery of a second victim, the sentence for the first robbery,
being less severe than that for the kidnaping, should be
eliminated; however, the robbery of the second victim, although committed in the course of the same criminal enterprise, was an offense against a person other than the victim of
the kidnaping and therefore was a proper subject of a separate sentence.
°

oj

I

PROCEEDINGS in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody after sentences imposed for one kidnaping and two
robbery convictions. Sentences for one robbery conviction set
aside; order to show cause discharged and writ denied.
Wilford Wright and Irving Jackson, in pro. per., and Arthur D. Dempsey, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Petitioners.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr.,
Gloria F. DeHart and Derald E. Granberg, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Respondents.
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioners were convicted of kidnaping
Linn Bayliss for the purpose of robbery, first degree robbery
of Bayliss, and first degree robbery of Joseph Brody. The
superior court imposed concurrent sentences. Petitioner
Wright appealed, and the judgment against him was affirmed.
(People v. Wright (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 866 [31 Cal.Rptr.
432].)
[1] Petitioners seek a writ of habeas corpus on the ground
that the convictions rest upon evidence obtained by an illegal
search and seizure incident to an unlawful arrest. The writ is
not nvailable to attack a final judgment on this ground. (In re
Lessard (1965) 62 Cal.2d 497,503 [42 Cal.Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d
39] ; In re Sterling (1965) 63 Cal.2d 486, 487 [47 Cal.Rptr.
205,407 P.2d 5].)
The opinion on Wright's appeal (216 Cal.App.2d 866)
reveals, however, that the kidnaping of Bayliss was part of an
indivisible course of conduct directed to the objective of
robbing him. The Attorney General concedes that under Penal
Code section 654 1 petitioners cannot be punished for both the
kidnaping and the robbery of Bayliss (In re Ward (1966) 64
Ca1.2d 672, 677 [51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400] ; In re Ponce
(1966) ante, pp. 341, 342-343 [54 Cal.Rptr. 752, 420 P.2d
224]) but contends that the concurrent sentences for those
offenses do not inflict double punishment forbidden by section
654. In support of this contention the Attorney General
invokes People v. Kynette (1940) 15 Ca1.2d 731, 762 [104
P.2d 794], in which this court, in answer to the contention
that consecutive sentences based on one act violated section
654, modified the judgment to make the sentences concurrent.
[2] l£he rule that concurrent sentences for crimes based
on one act or indivisible transaction do not constitute multiple
punishment (People v. Kynette, supra, 15 Cal.2d at p. 762;
People v. Sigel (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 279, 285 [130 P.2d
763]) has been rejected by many decisions, commencing as
early as People v. Oraig (1941) 17 Ca1.2d 453, 458 [110 P.2d
403], that modify judgments or reverse them in part to
remove the effect of such concurrent sentences. (People v.
Knowles (1950) 35 Ca1.2d 175, 189 [217 P.2d 1] ; People v.
Logan (1953) 41 Ca1.2d 279, 290 [260 P.2d 20] ; other such
1 Penal Code, section 654: "An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case ean it be punished
under more than one."
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. decisions are cited later herein and in Deering's and 'Vest's
Annotations to Penal Code section 654.) People v. Quinn
(1964) 61 Ca1.2d 551,555 [39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705], explicitly declares that such sentences constitute double punishment. Any effect of Kynette and Sigel as authority to the contrary must therefore be deemed to have been dissipated. (See
People v. Niles (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 756 [39 CalRptr.
11].)
Many cases have held that correction of jUdgments imposing concurrent sentences in violation of section 654 was
necessary to preclude the possibility that the multiple sentences would work a disadvantage to the defendant when the
Adult Authority considered the fixing of his term and parole
date. (E.g., People V. Craig, supra, 17 Cal.2d 453, 458; People
v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Ca12d 711, 716 [204 P.2d 321] ; People v.
Nor Woods (1951) 37 Ca1.2d 584, 586 [233P.2d 897] ; People
v. Brown (1958) 49 Ca1.2d 577, 593 [320 P.2d 5]; In re
Ponce, supra, ante, pp. 341, 342-343; In re Henry (1966)
ante, pp. 330, 331-332 [54 Cal. Rptr. 633, 420 P.2d 97];
People v. Branch (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 490, 496 [260
P.2d 27]; People v. Hawkins (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 832,
839 [17 CalRptr.'66] ; Adams v. Heinze (1962) 205 Cal.App.
2d 53, 55 [22 Cal.Rptr. 814].) The Attorney General contends
that this concern with possible prejudice is unnecessary in a
case such as the one before us because of the Adult Authority's policy of basing terms and parole dates not on the
number of concurrent sentences the prisoner is serving but on
the total circumstances of the offense and the offender, including the possibility of his rehabilitation. (See Comments of Mr.
Fred R. Dickson, Chairman, Adult Authority, First Sentencing Institute for Superior Court Judges (1965) 45 Cal.Rptr.
Appendix 99, 101-102, 114-115; People v. Denne (1956) 141
Cal.App.2d 499, 507 [297 P.2d 451] ; People v. Logan (1966)
244 Cal.App.2d 795, 798 [53 Cal.Rptr. 549].) The argument that violation of the proscription against double punishment may not prejudice a defendant in a particular case,
however, is not a convincing ground for overruling scores of
cases holding that the dual sentences should not be allowed to
stand.
[3] Section 654 forbids multiple punishment by imposition of the proscribed multiple sentences, but not multiple
convictions. (People v. Tideman (1962) 57 Cal.2d 574, 586 [21
Cal.Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007] ; People v. McFarland (1962)
58 Ca1.2d 748, 762 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449].) Whether
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the erroneously sentenced defendant actually suffers excessive
punishment cannot be the factor that determines whether the
section is applicable. In some situations concurrent sentences
violating section 654 would result in detrimental operation of
other statutes that govern punishment. 2 In other situations,
particularly misdemeanor convictions, section 654 is applied
although considerations of possible disadvantage to the
defendant from the operation of erroneous concurrent sentences cannot be predicted. (See People v. Vargas (1960) 179
Cal.App.2d Supp. 863 [3 Cal. Rptr. 925] ; People v. William.f
(1962) 207 Cal.App.2d Supp. 912, 919 [24 Cal.Rptr. 922].)
Only in cases of improper multiple sentences for felonies that
include a valid sentence of death can it be said that no useful
purpose would be served by modifying the jUdgment. (People
v. Chessman (1951) 38 Ca1.2d 166, 193 [238 P.2d 1001];
People v. Smith (1950) 36 Ca1.2d 444, 448 [224 P.2d 719] ;
People v. Wein (1958) 50 Ca1.2d 383, 409 [326 P.2d 457] ;
People v. Langdon (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 425, 435 [341 P.2d 303] ;
People v. Chessman (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 467, 496 [341 P.2d
679].)
[4] The cases cited in the margin,S however, suggest or
hold that concurrent sentences violating section 654 can be

~

)

. 2For example, erroneous concurrent sentences for first degree robbe17.
With a minimum term of five years and a maximum of life (Pen. Code,
§§ 213, 671), and for burglary with explosives, with a minimum term of
10 years and a maximum of 40 years (Pen. Code, § 464), would prejudice
defendant by requiring him to serve the longer minimum term for the
burglary and also permitting the Authority to exact service of the longer
maximum term for the robbery.
Under the habitual criminal statute (Pen. Code, § 644) defendant
would be prejudiced by erroneous concurrent sentences for an offense subj~t to a lesser penalty but available to support a determination of hab1'tua1 criminality (e.g., grand theft, with a maximum of 10 years [Pen.
Code, § 489]) and an offense subject to a greater penalty but not listed
in the habitual criminal statute (e.g., issuing a check without sufficient
funds, with a maximum term of 14 years [Pen. Code, § 476a]).
Erroneous concurrent sentences for petty theft, with a maximum term
of six months in jail (Pen. Code, § 490), and issuing a check not exceeding $100 without sufficient funds, with a maximum term of one year in
jail (Pen. Code, § 476a), would be detrimental to a defendant who suffered a subsequent conviction because he would be subject to the increased minimum punishments provided by Penal Code section 666 for
one who has been previously convicted of petty theft and" served a term
therefor in any penal institution. ' ,
.
apeople v. Anderson (1925) 75 Cal.App. 365, 371 [242 P. 906] ; People
v. Pearson (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 614, 618 [107 P.2d 463]; People v.
Dallas (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 596, 604 [109 P.2d 409]; Peopltl v.
Benenato (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 367 [175 P.2d 296]; People v.
McWilliams (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 550, 552 [197 P.2d 216]; People v.
Thomps01t. (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 4, 10 [284 P.2d 39].
To the same effoot were People v. Bean. (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 34, 41
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upheld as working no prejudice. Those suggestions and holdings are disapproved as inconsistent with our decisions that
multiple sentences forbidden by section 654, whether consecutive or concurrent, impose excessive punishment beyond the
power of the sentencing court and can be corrected on habeas
corpus. (Neal v. State of Oalifornia (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 11, 1617 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839] ; In re Oruz (1966) 64
Ca1.2d 178, 181 [49 Cal.Rptr. 289,410 P.2d 825]; In re Ward,
supra, 64 Cal.2d 672; In re Romano (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 826 [51
Cal.Rptr. 910, 415 P.2d 798]; In re Ponce, supra, ante, p.
341; In re Henry, supra, ante, p. 330.)
The Attorney General further states that our decisions are
in conflict as to the proper procedure to be followed by appellate courts to correct multiple sentences violative of section
654. He urges that if we refuse to uphold the sentences here
on either ground advanced by him (that concurrent sentences
do not inflict double punishment or that they are not prejudicial) then we should suspend execution of one sentence by a
procedure similar to that of the sentencing court approved
in People v. Niles, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755-756. 4
[198 P.2d 379] (disapproved in People v. Kehoe, supra, 33 Cal.2d 711,
115), and People v. Sharp (1922) 58 Cal.App. 637, 639 [209 P. 266]
(disapproved in People v. McFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d 748, 762).
4Defendant in the Niles ease was eonvicted of burglary and of a felonious assault committed as an incident to his sole objective of burglary.
The trial judge sentenced him on both counts but stayed execution on the
assault count pending any appeal and during service of any term fixed
by the Adult Authority on the burglary count, the stay to become permanent at the completion of service of any sentence for the burglary.
This procedure was upheld by the appellate eourt. (Accord, People v.
R08enfield (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 60, 62 [52 Cal.Rptr. 101]; People
v. Johnson (1966) 242 CaI.App.2d 870, 877 [52 Cal.Rptr. 38]; People
v. Jenkins (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 928, 934-935[42 Cal.Rptr. 373].) PeopZe v. Hernandez (1966) 242 CaI.App.2d 351, 358-359, 361-362 [51 Cal.
Rptr. 385], questioned the propriety of the procedure in Niles on the
ground that the express legislative recognition of the trial court's power
to stay execution in certain situations justifies the inference that the
Legislature meant to limit that power to those situations. (In re Collins
(1908) 8 Cal.App. 367, 369 [97 P. 188].) The Hernandez opinion (242
Cal.App.2d at pp. 358-359, fn. 1) suggests that the trial court can stay
execution of sentenee in only two situations, i.e., when probation is
granted (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.1, 1203a) and when an appeal is taken (Pen.
Code, §§ 1243, 1467). Suspension of execution of sentence is also authorized by statute, however, in the special statutory proceedings for those
convicted of crime who may be mentally disordered sex offenders. (Welf.
& Inst. Code, §§ 5500.5, 5501, subd. (a).)
It is true that a number of California cases declare that "A court
has no power to suspend a sentence except as an incident to granting
probation." (Oster v. Municipal Court (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 134, 139 [287
P.2d 755]; People v. Victor (1965) 62 Cal.2d 280, 287 [42 Cal.Rptr. 199,
398 P.2d 391]; see also the other cases cited in the Hernandez opinion;
Fricke, Cal. Criminal Procedure (6th ed. 1962) p. 509; 29 Cal.Jur.2d,
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[5] Since People v. McFarland, supra, 58 Ca1.2d 748, 763,
however, it has been settled that the appropriate procedure at
the appellate level is to eliminate the effect of the judgment as
to the less severely punishable offense insofar as penalty alone
is concerned. G
[6] Of the' two sentences imposed on each petitioner for
the one course of criminal conduct against Bayliss, that for
the robbery should be eliminated because it is less severe than
that for the kidnaping. The robbery of Brody, although
committed in the course of the same criminal enterprise, was
an offense against a person other than the victim of the
kidnaping and therefore is a proper subject of a separate
sentence. ( Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11, 20;
People v. Ridley (1965) 3 Cal.2d 671, 678 [47 Cal. Rptr. 796,
408 P.2d 124].)
Judgments, § 345.) Those eases, however, were concerned with suspension
of sentence as an act of lenience. The essence of their reasoning is that
since the Legislature has prescribed the method for exercise of such
lenience in the probation statutes, the trial court cannot suspend sentence
as an act of grace under some inherent or common law power (see E:c
parte Slattery (1912) 163 Cal. 176 [124 P. 856]; People v. O'DMnell
(1918) 31 Cal.App. 192, 191 [114 P. 102]; I'll. re Oolli1t.8, supra, 8 Cal.
App. 361, 369; but see People v. Patrich (1891) 118 Cal. 332 [50 P.
425]) and that in a probation situation the court's order suspending its
sentence must either be interpreted as a grant of probation, however in·
formal, or if the suspension cannot be so interpreted (as where the court
denies probation and nevertheless purports to suspend sentence) then the
order of suspension is void and the sentence is valid. (Oster v. MunioipalOourt, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 134, 139.)
Although the Legislature has not expressly provided for a stay of exe·
cution of sentence in the Niles situation, the power to proceed as the trial
court did in that case is within the fair import of section 654. As the
appellate court there explained (221 Cal.App.2d at p. 156) that procedure
reasonably reconciles the policies involved in applying section 654 to protect the rights of both the state and the defendant•
.C ISAccord: People v. Jones (1962) 211 Cal.App.2d 63, 14 [21 Cal.Rptr.
429]; People v. Frye (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 199, 803 f32 Cal.Rptr. 699];
People v. Bynes (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 268,212, 214 35 Cal.Rptr. 633];
People v. Rainey (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 93, 102 [36 Cal.Rptr. 291];
People v. Bailey (1964) 221 Cal.App.2d 440, 442, 443 [38 Cal.Rptr. 1181;
People v. Morrison (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 107, 115 [39 Cal.Rptr. 814];
People v. Gay (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 102, 105 [40 Cal.Rptr. 118] ; People
v. Buice (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 324, 341 [40 Cal.Rptr. 811]; People v.
Alvarado (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 189, 195 [42 Cal.Rptr. 310] j I'll. re
Keller (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 523 42 Cal.Rptr. 921] j People v.
Nelson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [43 Cnl.Rptr. 626]; People v.
Sipult (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 810 44 Cal.Rptr. 846] j I'll. re Allen
(1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 23, 25 [48 Cal.Rptr. 345J; People v. Thomsen
(1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 84, 91, 98 [48 Ca1.Rptr. 455]; People v. Davia
(1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 51, 56 [50 Ca1.Rptr. 215] j People v. Brumley
(1966) 242 Ca1.App.2d 124, 131 [51 Cal.Rptr. 131]; People v. Helms
(1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 416, 487 [51 Ca1.Rptr. 484]; People v. Remme
(1966) 243 Ca1.App.2d 618, 621 [52 Ca1.Rptr. 665].
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As to each petitioner the sentence for robbery of Bayliss is
set aside. Petitioners are not entitled to release since they are
held under other valid judgments of conviction. The order to
show cause is therefore discharged and the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., Schauer,

J.,. and Peek J.,. ~oncurred.

